This study assesses the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for better governance in JEL Classification: G20; O38; O40; O55; P37
Introduction
Positioning an inquiry on the relevance of knowledge diffusion in mobile phone penetration 1 for institutional quality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is motivated by at least six important currents in recent literature.
First, the phenomenon of globalisation is now an ineluctable process whose challenges can be neglected only by sacrificing the prosperity of nation states. Accordingly, there is a growing consensus in the literature that in the current era of globalisation, for nations to be competitive and well-integrated into the global economy, they need competitive edges in a number of fields (Tchamyou, 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Asongu, 2015a) . According to the narrative, competition in the 21 st century is fundamentally centred on the ability of a nation to acquire and diffuse new knowledge. The concept of knowledge economy (KE) has been mastered by Europe and North America which are inexorably setting the course of development in the international arena. Moreover, the historic pattern formulated by Japan has influenced the KE courses of Malaysia, China and the Newly Industrialized Economies of Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan). Whereas other Asian and Latin
American nations have been responding in calculated strategies that articulate the quest for KE in their growing pursuits of national and regional initiatives, the overall knowledge index of Africa has been dropping (see, Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 2015b) . It follows that there is a policy syndrome of KE in African countries when compared with their developed and developing counterparts.
Second, in terms of mobile phones, frontier markets of Europe, Asia and North
America have been witnessing some stabilization in growth (Asongu, 2015a) . This trend is in accordance with Penard et al. (2012) who concluded that, as of 2010, penetrations rates of the internet and mobile phones in Africa were not symmetrical. According to the authors, while mobile and internet penetration rates have attained saturation points in developed countries, African nations are currently experiencing some asymmetric development in the engaged 4 information and communication technologies (ICTs), notably with 41% (9.6%) for mobile (internet) penetration. In light of this fact, it is apparent that the mobile phone still has important potentials in Africa, which could represent important development opportunities if well-tailored towards critical development outcomes.
Third, there are growing requests in scholarly and policy-making circles for the mobile phone not to be considered as a silver bullet of development (see Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71; Asongu & De Moor, 2015a) . Within this skeptical framework, authors have recommended more scholarly research on the development outcomes of mobile phones.
Fourth, a World Bank report of April 2015 on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) shows that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world, with the exception of SSA, where about 45% of countries in the sub-region as still far-off from reaching the MDGs extreme poverty target (see World Bank, 2015) . This dismal evidence substantially contrast with the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015a, p. 44) . The immiserizing growth in the sub-region has also motivated a recent stream of institutional literature, notably, some recent books by: (i) Fosu (2015bc) on the nexus between growth and institutions in African development which aims to elicit whether the recent growth resurgence experienced by the sub-region is a myth or a reality and (ii) Kuada (2015) on the need to lay more emphasis on soft economics or human capability development for understanding development trends in the sub-region.
Fifth, government quality has been documented in recent literature to be strongly associated with inclusive growth, notably, in: improving standards of living through more efficient allocation of economic resources (Fosu, 2013ab; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Fonchingong, 2014) and consolidating the basis of social change (Efobi, 2015) .
Sixth, the growing literature on development outcomes from mobile phone penetration has scarcely engaged the effect on government quality in the sub-region, in spite of the documented role of mobile phones (Asongu, 2015c) and quality of institutions (Fosu, 2015bc) in inclusive development. In essence, to the best of our knowledge there are currently only four studies that have been positioned on the role of mobile phones in institutional quality in Africa (Snow, 2009; Mathias, 2012; Gagliardone, 2015; Porter et al., 2015) .
(1) Snow (2009) has established a negative nexus between a nation's mobile phone penetration rate and her perceived corruption level. The growing role of connectivity in consolidating accountability in Africa has been documented by Mathias (2012) . The nexus between government quality 5 and mobile-radio interactions has been assessed by Gargliardone (2015) who has concluded that the underlying interactions can significantly enhance government's efforts towards more corrective and preventive measures in Kenya. Porter al. (2015) position an inquiry on South Africa, Malawi and Ghana to establish that the burgeoning mobile usage by the youth on the continent has potentials to be tailored towards greater harmony between practice and policy.
Noticeably, the discussed literature leaves room for improvement in at least five areas.
First, contrary to engaged country-specific studies that are characterised with policy implications of limited scope, it is important to position inquiries on broader sets of countries for results with policy outcomes of greater application scope (see Porter al., 2015; Snow, 2009 ). Second, the engaged literature has focused on limited dimensions of government quality. This is the case with Snow (2009) who focuses on corruption which is only an aspect of institutional governance. Third, some inquiries have either not directly linked institutional quality to policy outcomes (see Porter et al., 2015) or not directly focused on the employment of mobile phones for greater government quality (see Gagliardone, 2015) . Fourth, some findings have cautious policy implications because the underlying empirical analyses are statistically fragile. For example, whereas Snow (2009) has concluded on a negative nexus between mobile phones and corruption, the findings should be welcomed with caution because they are not based on causality but on correlations. Fifth, on the complementarity between KE and mobile phones, Gargliardone (2015) has used mobile-radio interactions. We employ three KE variables.
The present study addresses above first-four gaps by assessing the role of the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for government quality in SSA. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 49 African countries and an endogeneity-robust Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. The knowledge diffusion variables on which the mobile phone is interacted in order to address the fifth gap are: education, innovation and internet penetration. Ten governance indicators are used consisting of six unbundled variables (voice & accountability, political stability/no violence, corruptioncontrol, rule of law, government effectiveness and regulation quality) and four bundled indicators (political, economic, institutional and general governance dynamics). The purpose of bundling and unbundling governance indicators is to avail room for robustness and more policy implications.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we clarify the concepts of governance and mobile (m) governance on the one hand and present the intuition and 6 theoretical underpinnings on the other hand. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results while Section 5 concludes with implications and future directions.
Clarification of governance concepts and theoretical highlights

Intuition and Theory
Consistent with Hellstorm (2008) , ICTs are important instruments for improving governance because they enhance accountability, openness, transparency and free-flow of information between various departments and institutions within a government. The narrative sustains that the mobile phone also facilitates information diffusion between the government and citizens on the one hand and the direct participation of citizens in the making of decisions that affect their livelihoods on the other hand. In summary, the above are also achieved by the overall appeal of the mobile phone in converging societies for better connection, participation, innovation and information.
With the above intuition in mind, Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has documented the theoretical underpinnings linking the mobile phone to better government quality. According to the theory, the historic dearth of ICTs in Africa endowed the elite with preferential ICTs facilities. This edge in ICTs substantially constrained transparency and accountability in the management of government offices. Hence, the elite were confronted with good conditions for corruption and mismanagement of public goods. Conversely, with the rapid and massive diffusion of ICTs in general and the mobile telephony in particular, opportunities for rentseeking and capitalising on information asymmetry for corrupt purposes are being increasingly reduced. In essence, the author postulates that decentralisation of ICT has broken secrecy barriers that until now have prevented, inter alia: the detection of corruption in public/private circles as well as oversight and punishment of corrupt officials. In a nutshell, the logic underpinning this theory essentially builds on the intuition discussed by Hellstorm (2008), notably: the mobile has substantially reduced the longstanding monopoly of information by the elite which resulted in corrupt behaviour and mismanagement.
Clarification of governance and mobile (m)-governance concepts
This section is engaged in four principal strands, namely: the concept of (m)- Tusalem (2015) , governance is a phenomenon that embodies: the rule of law, regulation quality, bureaucratic effectiveness and corruption. (4) To the best of our knowledge, the most popular governance indicators are those from Kaufmann et al. (2010) .
The corresponding six indicators are classified into three categories, namely: (i) 'institutional governance' which is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (measured with corruption-control and the rule of law); (ii) 'political governance' which is the election and replacement of political leaders (proxied with political stability/no violence and voice and accountability) and (iii) 'economic governance', which is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (measured with government effectiveness and regulation quality).
The third strand is concerned with criticisms associated with application of the underlying Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicators. Accordingly, despite some criticisms in scholarly circles, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have been promptly responding to critics.
One of the most interesting debates (to the best of our knowledge) has been with Andrew Schrank and Marcus Kurtz. For brevity and lack of space, we invite the interested reader to 8 consult the main currents underlying the debate, namely: measures and mechanisms (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a ); a reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a) ; a defense (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007b ) and a rejoinder (Kaufmann et al., 2007b) .
In the last strand, we devote space to articulating the intuition for bundling and unbundling governance indicators in order to present findings with more robustness and greater room for policy implications. For this purpose, the six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. are bundled into political, economic, institutional and general governances.
The relevance of unbundling and bundling governance variables is in accordance with an evolving stream of literature on institutional quality in Africa, notably: (i) predicting the Arab Spring based on negative governance signals (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015a) ; (ii) economic governance as the most important determinant of innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and (iii) governance tools in the fight against software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) and conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016) in Africa. Beyond the framework of African institutonal literature, the six governnce indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been considered in other branches of governance literature (see Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 2014; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015) . these indicators may be expected because income-levels are linked to higher governance standards and with a growing population, more government resources are expected to be devoted to serving and managing the population. On a cautious note, it is also important to balance this intuition with the fact that positive demographic change could also impede the government's ability to manage a growing population effectively.
Appendix 1 presents the definition of variables and their corresponding sources. The summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix. Based on the information provided by the summary statistics, it is apparent that: (i) means of the variables are comparable and (ii) from the corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. The objective of the correlation matrix is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity that could significantly bias estimated coefficients. From a preliminary assessment, the high degree of substitution among governance indicators is apparent. In accordance with the discourse in Section 2 on the imperative to unbundle and bundle governance dynamics, conceptual priority takes precedence over degrees of substitution. Moreover, the issue of multicollinearity is not of nature to bias estimated coefficients because the governance indicators are used exclusively as dependent variables in distinct specifications.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
The study employs PCA to bundle the six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion is used to retain common factors.
According to the authors, only common factors with an eigenvalue greater than one or the mean should be retained. It is apparent from We briefly devote space to discussing a number of concerns that may be associated with variables obtained from other regressions. According to Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015a) , the documented concerns are linked the efficiency and consistency of estimated coefficients as well as validity of corresponding inferences. Pagan (1984, p.242) had established that while two-step estimators are efficient and consistent, few valid inferences can be drawn. This caution is consistent with an interesting stream of literature on the subject, namely: Oxley and McAleer (1993) , McKenzie and McAleer (1997) , Ba and Ng (2006) and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a) .
Putting the above concern into perspective, Urbain (2012, 2013b) are to the best of our knowledge authors that have addressed the inferential quality of PCaugmented variables in the literature. The authors build on a bulk of previous studies ( (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012 ) to establish that it is possible to engage normal inferences from PC augmented regressions if estimated coefficients converge to their true values at the rate NT , (with T being the number of time series and N denoting cross-section observations). They have further articulated that for the underlying convergence to occur, T and N have to be sufficiently large. Unfortunately, as far as we know, the authors do not specify how 'large is large'. Within the specific context of this study, we are faced with two major concerns. First, N cannot be further increased because all existing 49 nations in SSA have been engaged.
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Second, extending T is at the risk of compromising the validity of specifications since it will result in instrument proliferation that will bias estimated results. In a nutshell, in our opinion, valid inferences are possible because Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015a) have recently concluded using the same governance indicators (though with lower T and N) that inferences do not substantially differ whether bundled or unbundled governance variables are used.
Estimation technique
The estimation approach adopted by this study is the GMM technique. As documented in Asongu and De Moor (2015b) , five main reasons motivate the choice of this technique.
Whereas the first-two consists of requirements for adopting the estimation strategy, the lastthree constitute advantages associated with the estimation technique. First, the estimation procedure is a good fit because the dependent variables are persistent. As apparent in that the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998 ) is a better fit compared to the difference estimator from Arellano and Bond (1991) .
In this study, we adopt the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which uses forward orthogonal deviations in place of first differences. The estimation approach has been documented to: (i) control for cross-country dependence and (ii) limit the proliferation of instruments or restrict over-identification (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) . A two-step approach is adopted in the specification because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the one-step approach is consistent with homoscedasticity.
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard system GMM estimation procedure. Given that the estimation technique being employed consists of using interactive regressions, it is relevant to briefly discuss some pitfalls associated with interactive regressions that have been documented by Brambor et al. (2006) . According to the authors, all constitutive variables should be involved in the specifications. Moreover, for the estimated parameters to make economic sense, they should be interpreted as conditional marginal impacts.
Empirical results
In accordance with mainstream literature on GMM application, four main information criteria are employed to assess estimated models (see Asongu & De Moor, 2015b) . First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference which stands for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, conversely, the alternative hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should be rejected because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, the Hansen (Sargan) OIR test is robust (not robust) but weakened (not weakened) by instruments.
Accordingly, for the purpose of limiting instrument proliferation, we have ensured that the rule of thumb requirement for restricting over-identification is met, notably: for each specification, the number of countries is higher than the number of instruments. Moreover, the validity of the Hansen OIR test is further assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments. Fourth, the Fisher test is also provided to examine to the joint validity of estimated coefficients. The following findings can be established from Table 3 . First, the effect of mobile phones is consistently positive on economic governance and its constituents. Second, marginal effects corresponding to interactions with innovation are consistently negative while those corresponding to interactions with internet penetration are positive, with the exception of 'regulation quality'-oriented regressions. Unfortunately, valid inferences cannot be established from the highlighted regressions pertaining to economic governance because of post-estimation presence of second-order autocorrelation in residuals. Third, net effects associated with the three remaining valid specifications related to 'regulation quality' and 'government effectiveness' are positive. Fourth, evidence of convergence is also consistently apparent. Fifth, most of the significant control variables display expected signs. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. (-1) 0.956*** 0.937*** 0.943*** ------------------(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Corruption Control (-1) ---------0.826*** 0.841*** 0.894*** ---------(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.
From Table 4 on the relationships between mobile phone penetration, knowledge diffusion and institutional governance: (i) the unconditional effect of mobile phone penetration is consistently positive on institutional governance and its constituents; (ii) conditional or marginal effects from interactions with innovation are consistently negative and that associated with education (internet penetration) in 'the rule of law ' (corruption-control) regressions is also negative; (iii) corresponding net effects are positive, with the highest magnitude in the innovation specification of 'institutional governance' regressions and (iv) most of the control variables are significant with excepted signs.
The findings from Table 5 pertaining to general governance are broadly consistent with those established in the preceding tables with corresponding marginal and net effects aligning with specifications on institutional governance in Table 2 . With a thin exception from the last specification in Table 4 , evidence of convergence is also consistently apparent in Tables 4-5 .
Concluding implications and further directions
We set-out to assess the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge for better Whereas the established findings are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings discussed in Section 2, they also have other relevant theoretical contributions, notably: on information asymmetry and convergence. First, with regards to information asymmetry, the mobile telephony reduces information asymmetry through enhanced oversight by civil society, public officials and households. In essence, the evidence that mobile phones are positively (negatively) correlated with the informal (formal) economic sector (Asongu, 2013) is an indication that a great chunk of civil society that operates within informal politicoeconomic and social sectors can contribute towards improving government quality through the mobile phone. In essence, the mobile telephony enables the sharing of information that ultimately reduces information asymmetry by allocating resources more efficiently and minimising 'government cost'. The narrative is broadly in accordance with the paradigm of information sharing for reducing information asymmetry in financial institutions (see Claus & Grimes, 2003) . Hence, based on our findings the theoretical underpinnings of information asymmetry in financial institutions can be extended to government institutions.
Second, the findings have shown that past differences in government quality have a less proportionate impact on future differences in government quality. In this light the equations on the left-hand-side have been decreasing over time. The corresponding economic interpretation is that countries with lower levels of governance are catching-up their counterparts with higher governance levels. The finding contributes to the theoretical underpinnings of catch-up literature in the perspective that catch-up is beyond incomeconvergence (see Asongu, 2014) and can be extended from GDP per capita to other development outcomes. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015a) have recently used catch-up in negative government signals to predict the 2011 Arab Spring. Overall, the findings established by this study are in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings of cross-country income convergence that have been substantially documented within the frameworks of neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992 Fung, 2009) (Asongu, 2015b) and financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012) . Given the limited applicability of beta convergence techniques within country-specific settings, the findings leave room for extension with the sigma convergence approach for country-specific trends on government quality catch-up. 
